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ATTORNEY'S FEES: THE MUSHROOMING
CLOUD OF LITIGATION
Robert W. Fioretti* & James J. Convery**
Ultimately, § 1988's straightforward command is replaced by a vast body
of artificial, judge-made doctrine, with its own arcane procedures, which
like a Frankenstein's monster meanders its well-intentioned way through
the legal landscape leaving waste and confusion (not to mention circuit
splits) in its wake.'
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976
(the Fees Act)2 specifically to give federal courts discretion to award attor-
ney's fees to prevailing parties in certain civil rights suits.3 Congress passed
the Fees Act in direct response to the Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,4 which reaffirmed the traditional
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The authors wish to express their appreciation for the invaluable assistance of William
Mackin, student, DePaul University College of Law.
1. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 455 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
2. Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976). The Fees Act amended 42 U.S.C. § 1988
to allow for the award of attorney's fees in civil rights cases. The statute reads, in pertinent
part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.],
or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq.], the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). The bill was introduced as the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976, S. 2278, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) and was passed by the Senate on Sept. 29,
1976. 122 CoNG. REC. 33,315 (1976). The House adopted S. 2278 by H. REs. 1591 and voted
in favor of the bill on Oct. 1, 1976. 122 CONG. REc. 35,119 (1976). See 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5908.
3. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5908-09.
4. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). In Alyeska, the plaintiffs represented a coalition of environmental
interest groups seeking to enjoin the Secretary of Interior from issuing permits for the construc-
tion of the Alaska oil pipeline. The plaintiffs claimed that the issuance of the permits would
violate § 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at
30 U.S.C. § 185 (1982)) and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, ch. 55, 83 Stat.
852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1982)). The
district court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction. Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325
F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970). Later, the court dissolved the preliminary injunction, denied the
request for a permanent injunction, and dismissed the complaint in an unreported decision. See
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American rule' that federal courts do not have the power to award attorney's
fees to successful civil rights litigants without express statutory authorization
or a special exception. 6 Prior to Alyeska, federal courts had awarded attor-
ney's fees to prevailing civil rights litigants under an exception to the
American rule; the courts considered the litigants to be serving as "private
attorneys general" to vindicate constitutional rights not only for themselves,
but also for other similarly situated parties. 7 The Supreme Court, however,
rejected the "private attorney general" theory as an invasion of the legis-
lature's province.'
Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 851 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
917 (1973). On appeal, the court reversed the district court and ordered it to reinstate the
injunction. 479 F.2d at 893.
Once the merits of the litigation were effectively terminated by new legislation, the appellate
court addressed the plaintiffs' request for an award of attorney's fees. Wilderness Soc'y v.
Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc). The court granted the petition for attorney's
fees based on the "private attorney general" theory. The appellate court stated that when
plaintiffs act as private attorneys general, they ensure the proper functioning of our system of
government and advance public interests. An award of fees would not have discouraged the
Alyeska plaintiffs from defending their case in court. Denying fees, however, might have
deterred the appellants from undertaking the heavy financial burden of the litigation. Id. at
1036.
5. The American rule was established in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
In Arcambel, the Supreme Court held that each party is expected to bear the costs of its own
litigation. The decision has generally been held to mean that courts should not permit fee
awards unless authorized by a statute or recognized equitable exception. See Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); 1 J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 717-18 (1971). Compare The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 362 (1824) (attorney's fees allowed as damages or costs) with The Baltimore 75 U.S.
(8 Wall) 377 (1869) (attorney's fees disallowed unless provided for by statute).
6. Prior to Alyeska, courts' fashioned three general exceptions to the American rule in
order to allow an award of benefits to persons other than the successful litigant. ,In Trustees
v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881), the Supreme Court relied on its traditional equitable power
to permit the trustees of a fund or property, or one who preserves or recovers a fund for the
benefit of others, to recover attorney's fees either from the fund or property itself, or directly
from those enjoying the benefit. The Greenough Court arrived at this result despite the existence
of a statute which limited fee awards to specified circumstances. See also Boeing Co. v. Van
Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1982) (recovery allowed in class action by bondholders under
the common fund doctrine).
The second exception is when a party acts in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974); Copeland v. Martinez, 603 F.2d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044
(1980); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1309 (2d Cir. 1973).
The third exception is when fees are assessed as a fine against a defendant who has willfully
disobeyed a court order. Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28
(1923). For further analysis of the American Rule, see Fioretti & Convery, Attorney's Fees
Under the Civil Rights Act-A Time for Change, 16 J. MAR. L. REV. 261 (1983).
7. See Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 270 n.46 (1975) (citing cases
that incorrectly utilized the private attorney general theory).
8. Id. at 271 (1975). The Court admitted that it was desirable to encourage the private
enforcement of environmental legislation, but nonetheless held that the American rule out-
weighed this consideration.
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Congress accepted the Supreme Court's challenge to permit the award of
attorney's fees and to rectify the "anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws"
that the Alyeska Court had created. 9 Because civil rights laws10 require private
enforcement,' Congress believed that fee awards were essential if private
citizens were to have a meaningful opportunity to assert the important
9. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao.
NEWS at 5909.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985-1986 (1982). The district courts are vested with original
jurisdiction to hear claims arising under the Civil Rights Act pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1343(a)(3)-(4) (Supp. V 1981). The section currently the subject of increased litigation is § 1983,
which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
Section 1983 was enacted pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, the fifth section of which
vests Congress with the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Congress satisfied the fourteenth amendment in 1868
and the enforcement provision, known as § 1983, was first used to enact the Klux Klan Act of
Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 333; 18 U.S.C. §§ 371-
372, 2384; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1861; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985-1986 (1982)). Litigants rarely
invoked § 1983 until 1961, when the Supreme Court broadened the Act's scope to encompass
official conduct which was previously considered exempt. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961).
Congress also wanted to allow court awarded attorney's fees in actions brought under §§
1981, 1982, 1985, and 1986. These provisions were enacted subsequent to the Civil War, a
critical time in United States history. Section 1981 is intended to confer equality in civil rights.
Section 1982 seeks to guarantee equality in property rights to all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States. Section 1985 prohibits conspiracy to interfere with another's civil rights.
Section 1985 also provides a remedy against conspiracies undertaken to obstruct justice. Section
1986 provides a remedy against persons who, having knowledge of a conspiracy which violates
§ 1985, fail or refuse to prevent the object of the conspiracy when they have the power to do
SO.
II. Congress explained the need for private enforcement as follows:
The effective enforcement of Federal civil rights statutes depends largely on the
efforts of private citizens. Although some agencies of the United States have civil
rights responsibilities, their authority and resources are limited. In many instances
where these laws are violated, it is necessary for the citizen to initiate court action
to correct the illegality. Unless the judicial remedy is full and complete, it will
remain a meaningless right. Because a vast majority of the victims of civil rights
violations cannot afford legal counsel, they are unable to present their cases to the
courts. In authorizing an award of reasonable attorney's fees H.R. 15460 is designed
to give such persons effective access to the judicial process where their grievances
can be resolved according to law.
H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. I (1976).
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underlying congressional policies.' 2 Additionally, Congress intended to re-
move financial barriers that might prevent disadvantaged people from having
access to the courts, and afford successful civil rights plaintiffs "the oppor-
tunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in court. '"'
During hearings on the Fees Act, 4 proponents of section 1988 viewed the
proposed bill as a narrowly drawn 5 response to the Alyeska decision and
emphasized that the bill was not intended to encourage meritless litigation 6
or provide aid 7 or windfalls 8 to prevailing counsel. The purpose of section
1988 is to ensure "effective access to the judicial process" for persons with
civil rights grievances; 9 Congress therefore adopted the moderate approach
of permitting courts, at their discretion, to award "reasonable" attorney's
fees to prevailing parties.2 Congress' rationale for this approach is that a
prevailing party "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special
circumstances would render such an award unjust." 2'
12. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 3, at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5910.
13. 121 CONG. REC. 26,806 (1975) (statement of Sen. Tunney).
14. For a detailed history of the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, see SUBCOMM. ON CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94th CONG., 2d SESS., CIVIL RIGHTS
ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976 SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS AND OTHER
ENACTMENTS (1976).
15. 122 CONG. REC. 35,126 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
16. 122 CONG. REC. 35,127 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Jordan); H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra
note 11, at 7.
17. 122 CONG. REC. 33,314 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); Id. at 35,128 (remarks of
Rep. Sieberling); Id. at 31,832 (remarks of Sen. Abourezk); Id. at 31,834 (remarks of Sen.
Helms).
18. H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 11, at 9; S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 3, at 6, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5913.
19. H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 11, at 1.
20. The discretion allowed by the Fees Act contrasts with other statutes that provide for
mandatory fee awards to non-prevailing parties. H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note I1, at 6-8;
122 CONG. REC. 35,115-17 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Anderson and Rep. Railsback).
21. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 3, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5912 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)). Compare this
rationale, however, with the standard for a prevailing defendant. The defendant may recover
an attorney's fee only when the suit is vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarass
the defendant. See H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note I1, at 7; Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
A district court's discretion to deny fees to a prevailing plaintiff is narrow. The special
circumstances rendering the award unjust are almost unanimously rejected by the courts. For
example, the good faith of a defendant is not sufficient. Ellwest Stereo Theatre v. Jackson,
653 F.2d 954, 956 (5th Cir. 1981); Bond v, Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1234 (7th Cir. 1980);
Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638, 646 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980); Nadeau
v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 280 (1st Cir. 1978); see also Milwe v. Cavuoto, 653 F.2d 80, 83
(2d Cir. 1981) (plaintiff's ability to afford an attorney insufficient); Aware Woman Clinic v.
City of Cocoa Beach, 629 F.2d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir. 1980) (financial impact on taxpayers not
a special circumstance); Brown v. Culpepper, 559 F.2d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 1977) (defendant's
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The traditional American rule,2" however, does not permit a successful
litigant to recover attorney's fees from an opponent unless a statute, contract,
or exception exists. New legislation attempts to vitiate the rule, 23 and there
are now more than 100 federal fee-shifting provisions. 24 With the proliferation
of fee-shifting statutes, litigation to determine the amount of the awards has
also multiplied. 25 The result has been an alarming growth in attorney's fees
litigation.26 The judiciary has subjected this area to uncertain and inconsistent
judicial interpretation; courts have obscured the basic Congressional purpose
for enacting the Fees Act and other fee statutes. These developments are
both undesirable and unnecessary.2 7
conduct is irrelevant to an award of attorney's fees). But see Brown v. Stackler, 612 F.2d 1057,
1059 (7th Cir. 1980) (egregious and overinflated fee request denied); Naprstek v. City of
Norwich, 433 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (challenged ordinance not a serious threat to
Constitutional right). See also Note, Judicial Discretion And The 1976 Civil Rights Attorney's
Fee Award Act: What Special Circumstances Render An Award Unjust, 51 FORDHAM L. REV.
320 (1982).
22. The American rule differs from the approach of many other nations. In Great Britain
fees are automatically awarded to the prevailing litigant in all lawsuits. See Comment, Court
A warded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 639 (1974).
For additional support for the American rule, see Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967), Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 197 (1878), and
Olerichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. 211, 230-231 (1872). See generally McCormick, Counsel Fees and
Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619, 619-42 (1931)
(suggesting that the American rule was needed in a frontier society to encourage use of courts
but today's congested court calendars require methods of promoting out of court compromises
and settlements); Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF.
L. REV. 792 (1966) (American rule is a burden on the poor and should be modified); Kuenzel,
The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation? 49 IowA L. REV. 75 (1963) (American rule
causes injustice).
23. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260-61 n.33 (citing 29 federal statutes that permitted fee awards
in certain actions).
24. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 & nn. 3-5 (1983). The appendix to Justice
Brennan's dissent in Marek v. Chesney, 53 U.S.L.W. 4903 (U.S. June 25, 1985), lists 120
Congressionally enacted fee-shifting statutes. Id. at 4915 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a detailed
compilation of fee statutes as of 1981, see E. LARSEN, FEDERAL COURT AWARDS OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES, app. C. (1981). The Attorney Fee Awards Reporter, published bi-monthly by Harcourt,
Brace, Jovanovich provides a current update of such statutes.
25. The number of reported cases involving fee litigation increases every week. A LEXIS
search conducted on March 11, 1986 revealed 2404 cases. The proliferation of litigation on
attorney's fees has led courts to complain that "[t]he fee proceedings have become the main
event rather than the side show," and that the "attorney's fees tail is wagging the civil rights
dog." Mills v. Eltra Corp., 663 F.2d 760, 761 (7th Cir. 1981).
26. This "new field of law . . . has grown so fast and become so complex that it has baffled
the effort of courts and lawyers to comprehend and apply it." Cutler, Foreward to I M.
DEFNER & A. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES (1983).
27. As Justice Powell observed, § 1988 "has become a major additional source of litigation.
Since its enactment in 1976, suits against state officials under § 1983 have increased geometri-
cally." Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1988 n.16 (1984) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Federal courts have read the Fees Act expansively since its enactment,2 8
and have produced numerous and differing opinions over the proper appli-
cation of section 1988. This article 9 examines these problematic areas under
the Fees Act in order to formulate guidelines that Congress should adopt to
aid courts in uniformly evaluating claims for attorney's fees. Congress should
establish these standards for the Civil Rights Act and the numerous other
statutes which shift the entire expense of litigation to state, local, and federal
governments. Although conflict and judicial confusion continue, the courts
have developed very few guidelines. Only Congress can resolve the apparent
dilemma over section 1988 and other fee shifting statutes.
I. THE PREVAILING PARTY REQUIREMENT30
The plain language3 and legislative history32 of section 1988 indicate that
either a plaintiff or defendant may be eligible for a fee award as a prevailing
party. Courts, however, apply different standards when considering a fee
award for a prevailing plaintiff as opposed to a prevailing defendant.
Courts generally award fees to a prevailing plaintiff under the standard
announced in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.33 Newman, a 1968
decision, is a Title 111 case involving racial discrimination in a place of
public accommodation. In Newman, the Supreme Court held that a victorious
plaintiff "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circum-
stances would render such an award unjust."35 In adopting this expansive
interpretation of the Title II fee provision, 6 the Court noted that the
Congressional intent to encourage private enforcement of civil rights would
be frustrated if fees were awarded only when the defendant acted in bad
faith.
Five years later, in Northcross v. Board of Education,7 the Court applied
the Newman standard in a suit brought to enjoin school segregation under
28. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (sections 1983 and 1988 apply to any actions
brought in state or federal courts to enforce rights secured by federal statutes); Maher v. Gagne,
448 U.S. 122 (1980) (no requirement that plaintiff obtain formal relief on the merits).
29. The authors endorse the Fees Act and the concept of awarding reasonable fees to
prevailing parties in civil rights' actions. They recommend changes, however, to eliminate the
unintended and undesirable side effects that have resulted in mushrooming litigation.
30. For more thorough insight into the following background material, see Fioretti and
Convery, supra note 6.
31. See supra note 2.
32. S. REP. No. 101l, supra note 3, at 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5908.
33. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982).
35. 390 U.S. at 402.
36. The Title II fee provision at issue in Newman provides: "[iln any action commenced
pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the United States
shall be .iable for costs the same as a private person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1982).
37. 412 U.S. 427 (1973) (per curiam).
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the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972.38 This act provided for attorney's
fees much like the provision in Title 11. 39 Since the attorney's fees provision
of the school aid act was similar to that in Title II, the Court reasoned that
the same construction was appropriate. 40
The drafters of the 1976 Attorney's Fees Awards Act adopted the Newman-
Northcross standard because it advanced the overall intent of Congress to
give prevailing litigants some assurance that their costs would be refunded.
As the Newman Court recognized, aggrieved parties should not be deterred
from seeking judicial redress because of the costs associated with legal
representation. Such a deterrence would frustrate the public interest in
protecting civil rights .4
In contrast to the prevailing plaintiff standard, it is currently more difficult
for a prevailing defendant to recover attorney's fees under section 1988. The
general rationale for this distinction is that prevailing defendants do not
"appear before the court cloaked in a mantle of public interest.'' 42 Permitting
defendants to recover fees in the absence of special circumstances that render
the award unjust would also thwart the legislative intent behind section 1988.
Impecunious plaintiffs, who fear losing their suit, would hesitate to seek
judicial redress unless their claims were highly likely to succeed. This would
curtail the private enforcement of civil rights claims. Congress recognized
these concerns and indicated that a prevailing defendant may recover fees
"only if the action is vexatious or frivolous, or if the plaintiff has instituted
it solely to 'harass or embarass' the defendant. ' 43 This prevailing defendant
standard was subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court in Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. EEOC. 44
There is no question that Congress intended that a "prevailing party" be
a completely succbssful litigant who receives a final judgment on a civil
38. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1619 (1976) (repealed 1978).
39. The fees provision of the Emergency School Aid Act provided that in cases involving
racial discrimination in education, the court could allow the prevailing party a reasonable
attorney's fee if it finds the proceedings were necessary to bring about compliance; the United
States, however, cannot be a prevailing party.
40. 412 U.S. at 428.
41. See Newman, 390 U.S. at 402.
42. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 1975).
43. H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 11, at 7.
44. 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). See also Davidson v. Keenan, 740 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1984)
(test not whether plaintiffs acted in good faith or on advice of counsel, but whether claim is
clearly meritless); Gerena-Valentin v. Koch, 739 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1984) (lawsuit duplicative of
action already litigated and resolved in trial and appellate courts); Shaw v. Neece, 727 F.2d
947 (10th Cir.) (fee award proper if plaintiff's action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2358 (1984); Lewis v. Brown & Root, Inc., 722 F.2d 209
(5th Cir.) (action was unreasonable and vexatious), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 975 (1984); see also
Jensen v. Stangel, 762 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1985) (district court may award attorney's fees to a
prevailing defendant only in limited circumstances).
19851
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rights claim. 45 Courts and attorneys, however, still struggle with two major
questions: (1) what constitutes a prevailing party for the purposes of an
award of attorney's fees, and (2) how large an award should the prevailing
party receive. Both section 1988 and subsequent Supreme Court decisions
have granted broad authority and discretion to lower federal courts in their
attempts to make these determinations.
The Supreme Court, in Hensley v. Eckerhart46 addressed both the pre-
vailing party and the award amount problems. The Court held that plaintiffs
are prevailing parties for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any
significant litigated issue that achieves some of the benefit sought in bringing
the suit. 47 In determining the amount of the award, a court must then
measure the extent of plaintiffs' success. 48
In Hensley, the plaintiffs represented a class of involuntarily confined
persons. The class plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of treatment and
conditions at the forensic unit of a state hospital. The district court found
that the plaintiffs prevailed on five of the six alleged constitutional violations.
The petitioner appealed only the fee award. The plaintiffs' four attorneys
claimed that they worked 2985 hours and sought payment at rates varying
from forty to sixty-five dollars per hour. The fees totaled approximately
$150,000. The state officials objected on numerous grounds, including coun-
sels' attempt to collect fees for hours spent on unsuccessful claims. The
district court, however, refused to eliminate the award for hours spent on
unsuccessful claims for two reasons. First, the plaintiffs had obtained sig-
nificant relief. Second, the defendants' suggested method of apportioning
fees failed to consider "the relative importance of various issues, the inter-
relation of the issues, the difficulty in identifying issues, or the extent to
which a party may prevail on various issues." '49
45. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 3, at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS
at 5909-10.
46. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
47. Id. at 433. The Supreme Court adopted the standard advanced in Nadeau v. Helgemoe,
581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978), that a prevailing party is one who succeeds on any
significant issue in the litigation. The Hensley Court noted that a plaintiff need only cross the
threshold of § 1988 to be considered a prevailing party. The most crucial factor is the success
obtained and not the amount of damages recovered. 461 U.S. at 433. In a footnote, the Court
approved the Christiansburg standard that a prevailing defendant could only recover an attor-
ney's fee when the plaintiff brings a vexatious, frivolous, harassing, or embarrassing suit. Id.
at 429 n.2.
48. 461 U.S. at 433-37.
49. Id. at 428. Eleven circuits have adopted the Hensley formulation of a prevailing party.
See In re Kansas Congressional Dist. Reapportionment Cases, 745 F.2d 610, 612 (10th Cir.
1984); Austin v. Dept. of Commerce, 742 F.2d 1417, 1419 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Gingras v. Lloyd,
740 F.2d 210, 212 (2d Cir. 1984); Fast v. School Dist. of Ladue, 728 F.2d 1030, 1032-33 (8th
Cir. 1984) (en banc); Abraham v. Pekarski, 728 F.2d 167, 175 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 3513 (1984); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1276-77 (7th Cir. 1983);
Lummi Indian Tribe v. Oltman, 720 F,2d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir. 1983); Kentucky Ass'n for
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On appeal, the Supreme Court believed that the district court adequately
justified its threshold determination that the class plaintiffs were prevailing
parties.50 The Court noted, however, that the district court failed to clearly
address two issues: whether the failed claims related to the successful claims,
and whether the level of success achieved made the total hours expended a
satisfactory basis for the fee award."
In discussing the first issue, the Court reasoned that claims unrelated to
the successful claims should be treated as if they had been raised in separate
lawsuits and therefore be omitted in determining the fee award. The Court
acknowledged, however, that an attorney may be unable to divide the hours
expended in the litigation on a claim-by-claim basis.52
The Court also observed that defendants could in good faith raise alter-
native legal grounds to reduce fee awards. A reduced fee award is appropriate
only when the success obtained is "limited in comparison to the scope of
the litigation as a whole." 53 The Court then reversed the decision below
because the district court never made a specific finding that the relationship
of the successful claims to the overall litigation warranted a specific fee
award.54
Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Conn, 718 F.2d 182, 186-87 (6th Cir. 1983); Lotz Realty Co. v.
United States Dept. of Housing, 717 F.2d 929, 931 (4th Cir. 1983); Miller v. Staats, 706 F.2d
336, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (pre-Hensley); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.
1978) (pre-Hensley).
The Eleventh Circuit follows the Fifth Circuit's more restrictive definition of "prevailing
party". See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. City of Hallandale, 742 F.2d 590, 591 (lth Cir.
1984) (plaintiff must succeed on the principal issue); Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. EEOC,
720 F.2d 1383, 1385 (5th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff must succeed on central issue); Doe v. Busbee,
684 F.2d 1375, 1381 (11th Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs not prevailing parties when successful claims
vacated on appeal).
50. 461 U.S. at 433.
51. Id. at 434.
52. Id. at 435. "Where the plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that is distinct in all
respects from his successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded
in considering the amount of a reasonable fee." Id. at 440.
53. Id. at 440. The Hensley Court specifically held that the success achieved by a plaintiff
is a "crucial" factor in determining the amount of an award of fees. Id. In a footnote, the
Court rejected a prior Eighth Circuit ruling in Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1978),
which allowed a fee award to a partially successful plaintiff. The plaintiff in Brown was a fired
school teacher who sought reinstatement, lost wages, $25,000 in damages, expungement of
derogatory material from her employment records, and costs and attorney's fees. The plaintiff
eventually recovered lost wages and her employment records were expunged. Noting that the
plaintiff lost on the major issue of reinstatement and only obtained minor relief in comparison
to the amount sought, the district court awarded attorney's fees only for hours spent on the
successful issues. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the lower decision, indicating that
the plaintiff was entitled to fees on her unsuccessful claims if they were not frivolous. The
Hensley Court rejected the court of appeal's analysis, stating that it was certainly well within
the district court's discretion to make a limited fee award in light of the minor relief obtained.
461 U.S. at 438-39, n.14.
54. 461 U.S. at 438. The Hensley Court remanded the case to the district court to determine
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Instead of clarifying the proper standard to be used in determining awards
of attorney's fees, the Hensley decision merely spawned further litigation;
the decision also increased the focus of the federal judicial system on fee
litigation rather than on the vindication of individual civil rights." This is
especially true when civil rights litigation is resolved by settlement or consent
decree or is dismissed as moot. Equally problematic are cases in which
plaintiffs receive only nominal damages or prevail on only some of their
claims.
A. Settlement or Consent Decree
The entry of a settlement or a consent decree is deemed to be success on
the merits under both Supreme Court precedent and the legislative history
of the Fees Act; in such circumstances, attorney's fees may be awarded to
a civil rights plaintiff.5 6 It becomes difficult, however, to determine the extent
of the success achieved when plaintiffs receive either less relief or a different
form of relief than that originally sought. In such situations, district courts
have emphasized divergent factors in determining attorney's fee awards.
In Gillespie v. Brewer,17 for example, a prisoner sought $100,000 in
compensatory and punitive damages from state officials for injuries suffered
when state police officers beat him and allowed an attack dog to bite him.
The state had prevailed in eleven similar cases that had gone to trial. The
plaintiff accepted $200 in settlement of his claim." The district court rejected
the proper amount of the fee award in light of the Court's new standards. It also held that
the fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting
the hours expended and the hourly rates. Id. at 437.
55. As of July 1, 1985, LExis showed 384 federal cases and 78 state cases citing Hensley.
56. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980). In Maher, the plaintiff brought an action
challenging state social welfare regulations. The parties entered into a consent decree which
provided for increased benefits to the plaintiff and other welfare recipients. The district court
granted the plaintiff's petition for fees and both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court
affirmed. See also S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 3, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 5912 (parties prevail when they vindicate rights by a consent judgment or
without formal relief).
57. 602 F. Supp. 218 (N.D. W. Va. 1985).
58. Id. at 220-21. The parties also agreed to bear their own costs and attorney's fees. Id.
at 221. The district court held that this "waiver" was against public policy due to an inherent
conflict of interest between plaintiff and his counsel. Therefore, the agreement was found to
be without full force and effect. Id. at 226-28. Cf. Jeff D. v. Evans, 743 F.2d 648 (9th Cir.
1984) (bifurcated settlement process imposed), cert. granted, No. 84-1288 (U.S. May 13, 1985);
Prandini v. National Tea Co. 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977) (required bifurcation of settlement
as to the merits and attorney's fees).
Recently, one appellate court has held that simultaneous negotiations of merits and fees and
waiver of fees and costs should not be prohibited per se. Moore v. National Ass'n of Sec.
Dealers, Inc., No. 83-2213, slip op. (D.C. Cir. June 4, 1985). In Moore, the plaintiff, a black
female employee, alleged sexual and racial discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, by the National Association of Securities Dealers. Concluding that a settlement was
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the defendant's contention that the $200 payment was merely a nuisance
settlement 9 and held that the plaintiff was a prevailing party for fees
purposes. 6° The court reasoned that the minimal amount of the settlement
was only relevant in determining the amount of the fee, not the plaintiff's
initial entitlement. 6' Despite the minor relief obtained by the plaintiff, the
district court ultimately awarded the plaintiff the full amount of the fee
request. 62
In Storch v. Payne,63 however, another district court found that the
plaintiff was not a prevailing party in a particular settlement. In Storch, the
plaintiff sued the state for sexual discrimination in her employment. The
parties reached a settlement whereby the plaintiff received five weeks of
possible only if attorney's fees were waived, the plaintiff finally negotiated a settlement
agreement that excluded a fee award. That waiver made Moore liable for attorney's fees already
paid to previous counsel (about $3,100) plus costs (about $34,000). The district court approved
the settlement agreement on the basis that Moore had voluntarily waived her right to costs and
fees.
The D.C. Circuit observed a confrontation between two important policies: the civil rights
fee shifting policy designed to encourage plaintiffs to protect their civil rights, and the general
judicial policy favoring settlement of disputes. Slip op. at 10. The court found that when
plaintiffs have a weak case and lack bargaining power, they may wish to use the potential right
to statutory fees as a bargaining chip towards achieving a more favorable settlement. Slip op.
at 11. Thus, neither simultaneous negotiations nor voluntary waiver of attorney's fees should
be foreclosed. Slip op. at 11.
In support of the district court's ruling, the appellate court noted that neither the fee statute
nor the legislative history of the Fees Act contained any prohibition of attorney's fees waivers.
Slip op. at 14-15. After reviewing the case law in other circuits, as well as ethics opinions of
bar associations, the court concluded that the propriety of simultaneous settlement depends
entirely on the circumstances of each case. Slip op. at 21.
The danger of a per se prohibition on simultaneous negotiations lies in possible unintended
consequences. The court found that the principal consequence was the discouragement of
settlements. Slip op. at 16, n. 13. Further, the court noted that a ban on simultaneous negotiations
implies a lack of trust in both the practicing bar's ability to engage ethically in settlement
negotiations and in the court's ability to check unreasonable conduct through the exercise of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rules 16 and 23. Slip op. at 23, n.15.
59. The district court was uncomfortable with the term "nuisance settlement," calling it an
"ambiguous label" that should not describe a final compromise. 602 F. Supp. at 222. But see
Chicago Police Officers' Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1980) (nuisance settlements
should not give rise to a prevailing plaintiff); cf. Parker v. Mathews, 411 F. Supp. 1059 (D.D.C.
1976) (totality of circumstances determines prevailing party in out-of-court settlements).
60. The court acknowledged it had taken a broad view on the issue of what constitutes a
prevailing party and noted that other courts have taken an extremely liberal view on nearly
every interpretation of § 1988. 602 F. Supp. at 221.
61. Id. at 225.
62. Id. at 230. The plaintiff originally sought $2760 in attorney's fees. The court reduced
this award by 35% because of the plaintiff's limited degree of success. The court then increased
the amount by 15% because the plaintiff's attorney had a contingent fee agreement. The court
also increased plaintiff's fee award by another 20% because the case was undesirable. Conse-
quently, the plaintiff received the full $2760 in attorney's fees even though he received less than
one-half of one percent of the original relief sought. Id. at 228-30.
63. 579 F. Supp. 1074 (Md. 1983).
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severance pay and a higher paying job in another department. Even though
the plaintiff obtained these benefits, the court held that she was not a
prevailing party. The court stated that, had the plaintiff gone to trial, she
probably would not have prevailed on the merits. Further, the job she
received through the settlement would not have been available to her had
she eventually obtained a favorable judgment.64
In Harris v. Jones County,65 the plaintiff settled a false arrest suit with
the defendants for $7500.66 Although the plaintiff acquired some of the
benefits he sought, he failed to show that his suit was a substantial factor
in motivating the defendants to end the alleged unconstitutional behavior.
Therefore, the district court held that the plaintiff had alleged only a prima
facie case as a prevailing party and was not entitled to attorney's fees as a
matter of law.
67
B. Mootness
It is equally difficult to determine whether there is a prevailing party when
remedial actions taken by a defendant prior to a judicial decision render the
litigation moot. Generally, attorney's fees are justified if the plaintiff shows
a causal connection between the filing of the suit and the defendant's action,
and establishes that the defendant's remedial action was required by the
court. 6 The plaintiff's lawsuit should be a substantial factor or a significant
catalyst in motivating a defendant to curtail unconstitutional behavior. 69
64. The court noted that the litigation did not cause any defendants to remedy any of their
alleged mistakes and that if sex discrimination did exist, the settlement did not alter its existence.
The plaintiff failed to establish any right or the proscription of any wrong, and she was therefore
not entitled to relief or attorney's fees. Id. at 1080.
65. 600 F. Supp. 1540 (S.D. Miss. 1985).
66. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that certain acts of the defendants, the
supervisors, sheriff, and jailer of Jones County, violated his state rights under Mississippi state
law and his Constitutional rights to due process and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.
Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief. Id. at 1542.
67. Id. at 1544-46. For additional rulings on prevailing parties in settlement cases, see Toth
v. United Auto., Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of Am., 743 F.2d 398 (6th
Cir. 1984) (fees granted to employee based upon benefits he received in a labor settlement
agreement), El Club Del Barrio v. United Community Corps., 735 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1984)
(failure of parties to provide for attorney's fees in a written settlement agreement insufficient
to deprive plaintiff of fees because a clear waiver is required), Jones v. MacMillan Bloedel
Containers, Inc., 685 F.2d 236 (8th Cir. 1982) (fees award is still possible despite a provision
in the consent decree expressly prohibiting such recovery), and Poston v. Fox, 577 F. Supp.
915 (D.N.J. 1984) (plaintiff prisoners were prevailing parties and were awarded fees because
they obtained changes in conditions and practices at the jail).
68. Williams v. Leatherbury, 672 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1982). See also DiFilippo v. Morizio,
759 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1985) (ambiguous victory with low damage award does not warrant
imposition of a negative multiplier); Ganey v. Edwards, 759 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1985) (award
of nominal damages does not prevent award of costs and fees).
69. Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1981).
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In B & J Music, Inc. v. McAuliffe, 70 the producers of an allegedly obscene
play sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent Georgia state
officials from making arrests or taking any actions to enforce local criminal
laws that prohibited their production. At the TRO hearing, the defendants
voluntarily agreed to refrain from making arrests, thereby rendering the
plaintiff's request moot. This situation lasted for six months, when the
plaintiffs moved for attorney's fees, claiming that they were a prevailing
party because their plays had not been disturbed or interrupted by the
defendants. 7' In affirming the district court's denial of a fee award, the
Eleventh Circuit held that fees cannot be awarded to plaintiffs merely because
they ultimately achieved their desired result, especially when the defendants
never intended to take the actions that the plaintiffs sought to prevent. 72
In contrast to the Eleventh Circuit, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held, in Premachandra v. Mitts,73 that a plaintiff was entitled to
attorney's fees when the defendants voluntarily agreed not to undertake
certain conduct, even after the district court, the Eighth Circuit, and the
Supreme Court had denied the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. In
addition to finding that the plaintiff's suit was a catalyst in achieving the
relief desired, the Eighth Circuit also found that the suit was not frivolous,
unreasonable, or groundless, and that the defendant's compliance was not
merely gratuitous.7 4 The court's ruling turned on the fact that the plaintiff
actually obtained relief, and not merely that he was legally entitled to relief. 75
70. 719 F.2d 1536 (lth Cir. 1983).
71. Id. at 1538.
72. Id. at 1539. The court of appeals refused to award fees when only potential civil rights
issues existed. The plaintiffs never achieved the relief that they sought and did not vindicate
any substantial right.
73. 727 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1984).
74. Id. at 722-23. Judge Gibson dissented, stating:
Dr. Premachandra's request for a preliminary injunction was denied, and repeated
requests for an injunction pending appeal were unsuccessful .... There has been
a sufficient determination, for attorney's fees purposes, that the VA's action was
not required by law, and therefore gratuitous. In light of the above standard, Dr.
Premachandra was not a prevailing party.
Id. at 733-34. (Gibson, J., dissenting).
The Eighth Circuit reduced the district court's fee award from $15,630.67 to $10,000 because
of plaintiff's limited success. Id. at 733.
75. See, e.g., Paragould Music Co. v. City of Paragould, 738 F.2d 973 (8th Cir. 1984)
(case dismissed as moot and plaintiff was not prevailing party since there was no likelihood of
success on the merits because the arcade, which obtained the TRO, went out of business);
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. East Baton Rouge Parish, 735 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1984) (Klan
prevailed only by virtue of a change in the law); see also Pomerantz v. County of Los Angeles,
674 F.2d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir. 1982) (when suit is moot as to all but one issue because of an
action unrelated to the suit, the prevailing plaintiff may still be entitled to fees on the remaining
issue); Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 850 (7th Cir. 1982) (no fees awarded to plaintiffs as
school systems abandoned use of allegedly discriminatory promotion standards for reasons
independent of suit); Sullivan v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Labor & Indus., 663 F.2d 443, 452 (3d
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C. Plaintiff Success on Some Issues
Section 1988 grants broad authority to courts in awarding attorney's fees
to prevailing plaintiffs who vindicate federal constitutional or statutory
rights.76 When a plaintiff prevails on only some of the issues, or on an
interlocutory motion,77 the intent of Congress to award attorney's fees is
less clear and therefore subject to much litigation.
In Gingras v. Lloyd,78 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated
a district court's award of $15,000 in fees to the plaintiffs, even though the
lower court had denied the plaintiffs request for relief in its entirety.7 9 The
Second Circuit stated that when a court does not rule in favor of a plaintiff
and the defendant does not take any remedial action, it is difficult to conclude
that the plaintiff prevailed. 80 The mere fact that the lawsuit reassured the
plaintiff does not make the plaintiff a prevailing party."'
Situations in which the plaintiff only prevails against certain defendants,
or only upon certain legal theories, also make fee determination more
difficult. The Hensley decision requires fee reduction for hours that are
spent on distinct unsuccessful claims and also when plaintiffs only achieve
limited success.82 In Wojtkowski v. Cade,83 the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit affirmed a district court's fee award of $3,870 even though the
jury awarded the plaintiff a total recovery of $6,000.84 In Wojtkowski, the
plaintiff originally sought $200,000 in compensatory damages against a local
Cir. 1981) (remanded to determine reasonable fee award because filing of Title VII action was
the catalyst for the successful resolution by arbitration), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982);
Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1981) (when only appeal, rather than
entire action, is dismissed as moot, prevailing plaintiffs may recover fees incurred in obtaining
preliminary injunction); Leroy v. City of Houston, 584 F. Supp. 653, 655-56 (S.D. Tex. 1984)
(award of attorney's fees may be granted if plaintiffs' conduct made important contributions
to the action that ultimately afforded plaintiffs the relief they sought).
76. See S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 3, at 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5908-09; Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 (1980).
77. As the Court stated in Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980), "it seems clearly
to have been the intent of Congress to permit such an interlocutory award only to a party who
has established his entitlement to some relief on the merits of his claim, either in the trial court
or on appeal." Id. at 757 (emphasis added). The Court strictly construed the legislative language
to reach this decision. See S. REp. No. 1011, supra note 3, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 5908, 5912.
78. 740 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1984).
79. Id. at 211. The plaintiffs in Gingras challenged the closing of a state hospital. Plaintiffs'
motions for class certification, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief were all denied. In
awarding fees, the district court noted that plaintiffs had moved the bureaucracy more quickly
and efficiently to care for former hospital patients. Id. at 213.
80. Id. at 212.
81. Id. at 213.
82. 461 U.S. at 440.
83. 725 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1984).
84. Id. at 129. Plaintiff's attorney sought costs, attorney's fees, and prejudgment interest
on fees for a total claim of $19,259.10. Id.
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town, the police chief, and three individual officers for unlawful arrest and
detainer. The plaintiff alleged that the town and its police chief provided
inadequate training and supervision but were not directly involved in the
underlying incident. The appellate court substantially reduced the plaintiff's
request for attorney's fees because the subject liability theories were distinct
from those of the guilty defendants, and because the damage award was
limited ."
Although the Wojtkowski court distinguished between successful and un-
successful claims for fees purposes, the First Circuit's analysis is the exception
rather than the rule .6 In Phillips v. Weeks,87 the plaintiffs sought to establish
a pattern, practice, or policy of police brutality in certain isolated instances
of misconduct by the defendants.8 After a thirty day trial, the plaintiffs did
not prevail on the issue of whether a policy or practice of brutality existed.
The district court lamented that "if the plaintiffs only wanted to prove
police misconduct involving arrests without probable cause and detention in
segregated facilities and had not tried to prove police brutality, the trial
would have taken three or four days rather than over 30 days." 8 9 Thus, the
court limited the results achieved by the plaintiffs in accordance with the
scope of the litigation as a whole, 90 and reduced the fee request to reflect
plaintiff's limited success. 91
Although the determination of the prevailing plaintiff has created addi-
tional litigation in the areas of settlement, mootness, and limited success,
plaintiffs' attorneys should acknowledge that fee awards are limited. Various
decisions hold that attorneys will not be compensated for time spent on
litigating distinct speculative claims or on seeking extensive relief when only
limited relief is available. As this awareness mounts, perhaps the courts can
return the focus of civil rights litigation to the aggrieved party rather than
to attorney's fees considerations.
II. FEE COMPUTATION
Computation of a prevailing party's fee entitlement is as vexing a problem
as the determination of the prevailing party. The Supreme Court, however,
85. Id. at 130.
86. See, e.g., Phillips v. Weeks, 586 F. Supp. 241, 246 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (cases involving
unrelated claims are unlikely to arise with great frequency).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 242.
89. Id. at 249. The court noted that certain citizen complaint procedures were changed as
a result of the litigation and that the suit was a factor in defendant's decision to integrate the
jail. Id. at 250.
90. Id. at 248-49. The plaintiffs' prayer for relief was an exhaustive list of requests for
declaratory and injunctive relief related to their claims arising out of the illegal policy that they
failed to prove existed.
91. Id. at 250. The district court previously arrived at an amount of $54,643. After finding
that the plaintiffs had only achieved 250o of the results they sought, the fee award was reduced
to $13,660.75. Id. at 251.
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gave some guidance in Hensley v. Eckerhart. 92 In Hensley, Justice Powell
observed that "[tihe most useful starting point for determining the amount
of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." 93 This computation method,
known as the lodestar, obviously vests the district court with much latitude
in awarding reasonable attorney's fees. 94 Such discretion, however, has led
to undesirable results, especially in light of the Court's warning that "[a]
request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation." 95
Courts need a more mechanical computation method that would eliminate
secondary fee litigation and subsequent appellate review. Such a method
92. 461 U.S. 424, 433-40 (1983).
93. Id. at 433.
94. In enacting the Fees Act, Congress indicated a preference for the use of fee computation
methods similar to those used in other types of litigation. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 3, at
6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5913. The Senate report cited with
approval several cases in which fees were appropriately awarded. See Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64
F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436
U.S. 547 (1978); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9444 (C.D. Cal.
1974).
Following the Hensley directive, circuit courts have embraced two commonly employed fee
computation methods: (A) the lodestar method, see, e.g., Lindy Bros. Builders v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167-68 (3d Cir. 1973) (reasonable hourly
rate times number of hours expended); and (B) the Johnson factors method, see Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-719 (5th Cir. 1974). The Johnson factors
are twelve considerations which a judge may assess in awarding fees: (1) the time and labor
required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill required to perform the
legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance
of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations
imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount of moving involved and the results
obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of
the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12)
awards in similar cases. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106
(1979) with MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (1983) (listing eight factors from
which Johnson is derived).
Application of these methods, however, has been inconsistent. Some circuits have utilized
the lodestar approach, see, e.g., Anderson v. Morris, 658 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1981); Copeland
v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Furtado v. Bishop, 635 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1980);
City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Builders v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973). Other circuits have utilized
the Johnson factor approach, see, e.g., Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1980); Francia
v. White, 594 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1979). Some circuits have mixed the two; see, e.g., Copper
Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 624 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1980); Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild
Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1975).
95. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 19-20
(D.C. Cir. 1984) ("When the numbers fed into the lodestar are fundamentally arbitrary, no
amount of calculation can restore objectivity. The fee setting approach becomes a complex and
expensive overlay of delusive mathematical form over a process fundamentally grounded in an
arbitrary assessment."). See also National Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense,
675 F.2d 1319, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (market rate information should be as
specific as possible).
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would provide sufficient compensation to attract competent counsel without
providing counsel with outrageous windfalls.
96
A. Reasonable Hourly Rates
A significant problem with the lodestar approach is the difficulty of
determining a reasonable hourly rate of compensation. 97 In recent years, the
idea of imposing a fee ceiling in civil rights cases has gained momentum in
both the legislature and the judiciary. Congress recently proposed the Legal
Fee Equity Act,9 " which is patterned after the Equal Access to Justice Act. 99
The legal fee act establishes a fee ceiling of seventy-five dollars per hour for
all fee awards mandated by federal statute or involving state action.1°°
96. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 3, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5908. This article advocates supplanting the current lodestar formulation (reasonable hourly
compensation rate times the number of hours reasonably expended) with a more rigid formu-
lation composed of a Congressionally prescribed hourly compensation rate times the number
of well-documented hours reasonably expended.
97. "Courts disagree on what factors should be applied, how they should be applied, and
even what they mean .... As a result, in cases decided between 1974 and 1979, hourly rates
awarded to civil rights attorneys varied by 685 percent." NATIONAL AssocIATION OF ATTORNEYS
GENERAL, REPORT TO CONGRESS, CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARD ACT OF 1976, at 12
(Feb. 3, 1984), 130 CONG. REC. S8842, 8843 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) [hereinafter cited as
NAAG REPORT].
98. S. 2802, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 27, 1984); H.R. 5757, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (May
31, 1984). The general purpose of the bill is to establish procedures to ensure that fees awards
to prevailing attorneys are reasonable. One commentator noted that "[a]lthough the 98th
Congress expired before S. 2802 could progress beyond committee consideration, it is certain
to be reintroduced and reviewed in the 99th Congress." Rader, The Fee Act of 1976: Examining
the Foundation for Legislative Reform of Attorneys' Fees Shifting, 18 J. MAR. L. REV. 77,
114 (1984).
99. Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980). The Equal Access to Justice Act contained
a sunset provision which allowed the Act to expire on October 1, 1984. The Act will continue
to apply through final disposition of all pending cases filed thereunder. 94 Stat. at 2329.
Congress passed a bill, H.R. 5479, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), that would have permanently
reauthorized the Equal Access to Justice Act, but the President vetoed it. See 42 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 2964 (1984). The Reagan administration apparently favors passage of the Fee
Equity Act. See 10 ABA LITIGATION NEWS 5, 27 (Fall 1984). See generally Robertson & Fowler,
Recovering Attorneys' Fees from the Government Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 56
TUL. L. REV. 903 (1982) (dealing with problems in interpreting and implementing the Equal
Access to Justice Act).
100. There was little precedential authority for the $75 an hour fee ceiling under the Equal
Access to Justice Act. However, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) (1982) provided for the award of
attorney's fees in social security benefit claims cases up to 25076 of the past due benefits, and
38 U.S.C. § 3404(c)(2) (1982) provided for the award of attorney's fees of up to $10 per claim
in veterans' benefit claims cases. In these cases the fees are deducted from the benefits won by
the claimant. See Robertson & Fowler, supra note 99. See also New York Ass'n for Retarded
Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1983) (setting "break point" ceiling of $75 an
hour under § 1988 for public civil rights attorneys).
Much testimony was given before the Senate Subcommittee supporting a ceiling of $75 per
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The judiciary has also become increasingly exasperated with the nebulous
process of determining what constitutes a reasonable rate of compensation.
In Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,'0 1 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Colu'mbia found that a private law firm's established billing rate provides
an easily ascertainable fixed market rate for calculating a section 1988 legal
fee. The Court held that such rates were presumptively fair. 0 2 The Laffey
court nevertheless admitted that tedious, ad hoc reasonable hourly rate
determinations are inevitable where a firm has no established billing rate.
In Blum v. Stenson, 03 the Supreme Court stated that reasonable fees
should be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the local
community, °4 and that the calculation should include such factors as the
attorney's experience, skill, and reputation. 05 This method also has its
hour. For example:
The Hon. Carol Dinkin, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice:
"Even with the $75-an-hour limitation, there have been many lawsuits brought
under the Equal Access to Justice Act. That number has not, I think, deterred
litigation." The Hon. Francis X. Bellotti, attorney general of Massachusetts: "We
would have no difficulty at all in attracting competent counsel for $75 an hour.
Ours is an urban northeast state where fees are high generally .... But the short
answer is: I would have no problem with $75 an hour .... The Hon. Steven
Clark, attorney general of Arkansas: "In Arkansas, $75 an hour would attract
competent counsel without question." The Hon. David L. Wilkinson, attorney
general of Utah: "That figure of $85 or $95 a hour is for the best firm in town I
could find. I think that in our state $75 could attract competent counsel ......
The Legal Fee Equity Act: Hearings on S. 2802 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 134, 350 (1984).
101. 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
102. Id. at 24. See also Henry v. Webermeier, 738 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1984) (hourly rate
submitted by plaintiff viewed as a "benchmark").
103. 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1547 (1984). The Court noted that:
We recognize, of course, that determining an appropriate "market rate" for the
services of a lawyer is inherently difficult. Market prices of commodities and most
services are determined by supply and demand. In this traditional sense there is no
such thing as a prevailing market rate for the service of lawyers in a particular
community. The type of services rendered by lawyers, as well as their experience,
skill and reputation, varies extensively-even within a law firm .... But the fee
usually is discussed with the client, may be negotiated, and it is the client who pays
whether he wins or loses. The § 1988 fee determination is made by the court in an
entirely different setting: there is no negotiation or even discussion with the pre-
vailing client, as the fee-found to be reasonable by the court-is paid by the losing
party.
Id. at 1547, n. II.
104. Id. at 1547 n.1l.
105. Id. at 1544-45 nn.4-5, 1546 n.9. See also Laffey. v. Northwest Airlines Inc., 746 F.2d 4
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Furtado v. Bishop, 635 F.2d 915 (Ist Cir. 1980). The existence of an
independent pre-existing contingency fee agreement between the plaintiff and his attorney does
not limit the potential fee award under § 1988. Such an agreement is relevant to the determination
of the attorney's value. Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir. 1983).
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drawbacks. In Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Goodwin,106 Professor Laurence Tribe,
the well-known Harvard constitutional law scholar, represented the prevailing
party. After successfully proving that a Massachusetts zoning law was un-
constitutional, Professor Tribe requested $331,441 in fees at an effective
hourly rate of $412.50 per hour." 7 Although the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit reduced Professor Tribe's request, 08 the decision clearly dem-
onstrates the potential for excessive fee requests based on experience and
skill. 1°9 Congress must now determine how much it should cost to ensure
that a civil rights plaintiff has a sufficient opportunity to vindicate his or
her rights.'' 0
Under the Fee Act's prevailing party requirement,'" fee awards are essen-
tially merit-based and should be limited to successful civil rights litigators.
The paramount consideration, as the Supreme Court has recognized," 2 is
106. 495 F. Supp. 761 (D. Mass. 1980), rev'd, 662 F.2d 88, aff'd on reh'g, 662 F.2d 102
(Ist Cir. 1981).
107. The $412.50 rate comprised a $275 an hour fee plus a 50%70 multiplier. See also Rivera
v. City of Riverside, 679 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1982) (vacated and remanded in light of Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 952 (1983)).
108. The court sustained Tribe's hourly compensation rate of $275 an hour but denied an
increase in the lodestar award. Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 582 F. Supp. 1220, 1228-29 (D.
Mass. 1984).
109. Litigation in this area may increase substantially in light of Institutionalized Juveniles
v. Secretary of Public Welfare, 758 F.2d 897 (3d Cir. 1985), in which the court suggested that
a separate fee determination for the preparation of the actual fee petition may also be subject
to a Hensley analysis. Id. at 924.
110. Awarding a flat hourly rate of compensation to all prevailing litigators would simplify
the fee calculus and significantly ease the courts' current fee litigation burden. However,
Congress should allow for demographic variables such as cost of living differences. A congres-
sionally mandated fee range might be awarded in accordance with regional economic variances.
In prescribing a rate of hourly compensation for prevailing civil rights litigators, Congress
must recognize several important considerations. The most important, and the primary moti-
vation for enacting § 1988, is the need to ensure that victims of legitimate civil rights violations
would have the opportunity to vindicate those rights. The second consideration is the need to
maximize the efficiency of the courts in order to afford greater access to civil rights plaintiffs.
Judicial resources are limited, valuable, and often wasted in resolving fee disputes of questionable
social importance. The third consideration is the need to protect the public coffers, sustained
by tax dollars, from unnecessary fee awards.
These considerations, however, are often obscured when attorneys clamor for the award of
a "reasonable" fee every time they bring a civil rights suit. Essentially, this phenomenon is an
example of not seeing the forest for the trees. Section 1988 was not enacted to "create a ...
fee bank to be liberally drawn upon by lawyers for their own welfare," Coop v. City of South
Bend, 635 F.2d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 1980), but rather to provide a judicial forum to persons
seeking to preserve and expand basic individual and societal rights. Therefore, Congress should
prescribe an hourly rate that will maximize such opportunities within limited judicial and tax-
generated resources.
11l. Unsuccessful defendants are faced with a "catch-22" situation in which they must
choose between paying exorbitant fees or continuing litigation over the fees while watching
them skyrocket even higher. See Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75, 77 (lst Cir. 1978).
112. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37.
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that an attorney should be compensated only for results." 3 Every civil rights
plaintiff must be afforded all opportunities to vindicate fundamental rights."1
4
Therefore, fee awards must be sufficient to attract competent attorneys.
Soaring fee awards are ultimately exacted from the public purse. Ambig-
uous fee standards also make the court system inefficient. Congress must
consider basic economic principles, and remember that significant values
inhere in the vindication of civil rights." 5 Congress must therefore set an
hourly compensation rate that is sufficient to attract attorneys who possess
qualities that are essential to the effective enforcement of basic civil liberties.
Given the current abundance of attorneys," 6 this goal should not be difficult
to achieve. Of course, the hourly compensation rate should also vary to
accommodate geographic differences. Although a statutorily prescribed fee
may limit the potential recovery available to highly priced attorneys, the
purpose of the Fees Act is to "benefit meritorious claimants, not to subsidize
the legal profession."'' 7 Furthermore, a prescribed rate would reduce much
of the time currently spent on litigating disparate fee awards.
B. Hours Reasonably Expended
A court must examine the total number of hours expended and then
disallow unproductive time or time spent on unsuccessful claims to determine
the number of hours reasonably expended by a prevailing party's counsel."'
Time actually expended is not necessarily time reasonably expended."19 This
calculation is feasible because civil rights attorneys know that they are
113. Id.
114. "l]n enacting § 1988, Congress determined that the public as a whole has an interest
in the vindication of the rights conferred by the statutes enumerated in § 1988, over and above
the value of a civil rights remedy to a particular plaintiff." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 444-45 n.4
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. As the court of appeals in Laffey observed, "[clreation of a prevailing community rate
by fiat is a task for the Congress, and not for this Court .... All we can do is simplify and
make more certain-and thus make more speedy, economical, and ultimately fairer ... the fee
setting process." 746 F.2d 4, 19 n.98 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
116. In every major metropolitan area there are a substantial number of lawyers who possess
the skill to handle all but the most unusual civil rights cases. More than eight percent of all
civil cases filed in federal court from June 30, 1983, to June 30, 1984, were civil rights suits.
See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 134 (1984). This number looms even larger since 17.7% of all cases were for recovery
of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and 11.507o were social security cases. Id.
More than 27% of the cases heard in the United States Courts of Appeals were civil rights
cases. Id. at 112.
117. See Murray v. Weinberger, 741 F.2d 1423, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
118. "A district judge may not ... authorize the payment of attorney's fees unless the
attorney involved has established by clear and convincing evidence the time and effort claimed
and shown that the time expended was necessary to achieve the results obtained." Hensley,
461 U.S. at 440-41 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also Murray v. Weinberger, 741 F.2d 1423,
1427 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (unnecessary hours to be excluded from the calculation).
119. See Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc).
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expected to exercise billing judgment 2 ° and keep sufficiently detailed time
records to substantiate the time expended and the services provided.' 2 '
As a practical matter, courts have responded to the problem of excessive
and duplicative hours by using percentage cuts.'2 2 Attorneys should not feel
overburdened by this scrutiny; courts have usually sustained reasonable
additional expenditures such as those for necessary research 23 or for an extra
attorney's trial assistance.' 2 Disputes can easily be resolved by examining
billing documents. Thorough documentation allows the court to examine a
clear record from which it may determine not only which hours are reason-
able, but which hours were spent on successful issues.
Multiplying a prescribed hourly rate by the number of well documented
hours, while admittedly a somewhat mechanical lodestar, will significantly
reduce the burden upon district courts. This lodestar method will allow
courts to focus their resources on substantive claims while also establishing
a reliable gauge to measure the extent of a potential fee award early in the
litigation.' 21 Furthermore, appellate review of fee cases would be less frequent
and more easily resolved. Unsuccessful defendants would then be dissuaded
from engaging in:
what must be one of the least socially productive types of litigation
imaginable: appeals from the awards of attorney's fees, after the merits
of the case have been concluded, when the appeals are not likely to affect
the amount of the final fee. Such appeals, which greatly increase the costs
to plaintiffs of vindicating their rights frustrate the purpose of § 1988.116
120. "It would be inconceivable that the prevailing party should not be required to establish
at least as much to support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as a lawyer would be required to
show if his own client challenged the fees." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
See also Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (billing judgment is as
important in public civil rights litigation as it is in the private sector).
121. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 441 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also Ramos v. Lamm, 713
F.2d 546, 553 (10th Cir. 1983) (providing guidelines for award of fees).
122. See, e.g., Institutional Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897 (3d Cir.
1985) (50% cut); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1146
(2d Cir. 1983) (5% to 20% cuts); Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron,
604 F. Supp. 1275 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (20076 cut); Ross v. Saltmarsh, 521 F. Supp. 753, 761-62
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (five to ten percent cuts), aff'd mem., 688 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1982).
123. See Ross v. Saltmarsh, 521 F. Supp. 753, 757-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
124. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Assoc. of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848 (8th
Cir. 1981); Tasbey v. Estes, 651 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1981). But see Roe v. City of Chicago, 586
F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Il1. 1984). In Roe, the court found the use of multiple attorneys in a
relatively simple civil rights case unjustified. The court stated that "[tihere is no justification
for saddling an opponent with the kind of double-timing by lawyers reflected in this case. What
is at work here is an example of what has brought the cost of legal services out of the reach
of most of our populace." Id. at 514.
125. Litigants should settle the fee amount but the parties probably will not do so when they
have "no way of estimating how much a court would award in a particular case." NAAG
REPORT, supra note 97, at 29. 130 CONG. REC. S8842, 8843 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
126. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 442 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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C. Multipliers
Courts often used multipliers or bonuses to enhance fee awards prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Blum v. Stenson.'27 In Blum, the Supreme
Court recognized the arbitrariness and excessiveness of fee awards that are
enhanced by multipliers, and stated that the plain lodestar calculation usually
yields a presumptively reasonable fee. 2 " The Court nevertheless refused to
accept the argument that an upward adjustment is never permissible. The
Court reasoned that there may be circumstances when the lodestar results in
an unreasonably low fee. 129 More specifically, an upward adjustment would
be justified when the fee applicant offers specific evidence to show that
counsel provided superior legal services or achieved exceptional success. 130
Some jurists argue that multipliers produce an inherent windfall to attor-
neys and should therefore be totally abolished. 3 ' The National Association
of Attorneys General claims that the use of multipliers, or bonuses, is
inconsistent with, and not supported by, the legislative history of the Fees
Act, is an arbitrary enhancement of a reasonable award, and encourages
litigation of meritless claims.'32 Although the Supreme Court has limited the
number of situations in which multipliers may be used, a circuit split has
already developed over whether or not multipliers are properly used to
enhance a fee award when a high risk suit is ultimately successful.' 33
Congress must review the use of multipliers and determine whether a need
exists for such an award in light of the Hensley standard for reasonable
fees. If Congress decides to retain the use of multipliers, it must develop
clear and specific guidelines for their use.
D. Rule 68 - Offer of Judgment
As judicial interpretation of section 1988 grows more diverse, state and
local government units have sought to avoid the pitfalls of unnecessarily
127. 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984). See, e.g., Graves v. Barnes, 700 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1983)
(multiplier of two); Rajender v. University of Minn., 546 F. Supp. 158 (D. Minn. 1982)
(multiplier of three); West v. Redman, 530 F. Supp. 546 (D. Del. 1982) (multiplier of 1.75);
Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (multiplier of 3.5); Wells v. Hutchinson,
499 F. Supp. 174 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (multiplier of two); Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 481 F. Supp.
776 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (multiplier of two).
128. 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984).
129. Id. at 1548.
130. Id. at 1550.
131. NAAG REPORT, supra note 97, at 32-40. 130 CONG. REc. S8842, 8843 (daily ed. June
29, 1984).
132. The NAAG REPORT recommends that Congress amend the Fees Act to prohibit the
award of bonuses or multipliers. NAAG REPORT, supra note 97, at 40. See also Coleman v.
Frierson, 607 F. Supp. 1578, 1581 (N.D. III. 1985) (Supreme Court decisions have given mixed
signals regarding multipliers).
133. Compare Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (no allowance
for risk factor) with Hall v. Borough of Roselle, 747 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1984) (allowing upward
adjustment based on risk factor).
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protracted civil rights litigation. 34 One recently utilized tool is Rule 68 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is designed to encourage the
early settlement of litigation. 3 ' Due to conflicting interpretations of the
Rule,'16 both the Supreme Court and the Federal Rules Advisory Committee
are considering possible changes to Rule 68.
The Supreme Court recently decided the case of Marek v. Chesney'3 7 which
will primarily affect attorneys seeking statutory fee awards. In Marek, the
Court determined whether attorney's fees, which § 1988 defines as part of
costs, are among the costs encompassed by Rule 68 for the purpose of
determining the plaintiffs' fee liability when they reject an offer of settlement
and later obtain a final judgment less favorable than the original settlement
offer. 3" The Seventh Circuit had reversed the district court, stating that Rule
68 costs do not include the defendant's attorney's fees even though the
plaintiff's costs do. 139 The Seventh Circuit further stated that a plaintiff's
rejection of a defendant's Rule 68 offer, including those situations when the
offer was more favorable than the final judgment, did not bar the plaintiff
134. See Note, Rule 68: A "New" Tool for Litigation, 1978 DUKE L.J. 889, 898-902; Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Shavel, Suit, Settlement, And Trial: A Theoretical
Analysis Under Alternative Methods For The Allocation Of Legal Costs, I I J. LEG. STUD. 55
(1982); Note, The Proposed Amendments To Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68: Toughening
The Sanctions, 70 IowA L. REV. 237 (1984).
135. FED. R. Civ. P. 68 provides as follows:
Offer of Judgment. At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party
defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow
judgment to be taken against him for the money or property or to the effect
specified in his offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the service
of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either
party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service
thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted shall
be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding
to determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more
favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making
of the offer. The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a
subsequent offer. When the liability of one party to another has been determined
by verdict or order or judgment, but the amount or extent of the liability remains
to be determined by further proceedings, the party adjudged liable may make an
offer of judgment, which shall have the same effect as an offer made before trial
if it is served within a reasonable time not less than 10 days prior to the com-
mencement of hearings to determine the amount or extent of liability.
136. Compare Fulps v. City of Springfield, 715 F.2d 1088 (6th Cir. 1983) (attorney's fees
are included in "costs") with Pigeaud v. McLaren, 699 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1983) (fees not
included). See also Delta Airlines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346 (1981) (fees not included).
137. 53 U.S.L.W. 4903 (U.S. June 25, 1985). The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh
Circuit and held that civil rights plaintiffs, like any other plaintiffs who reject offers more
favorable than what is ultimately recovered at trial, will not recover attorney's fees for services
performed after the offer is rejected. Id. at 4906.
138. Id. at 4904.
139. Id.
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from recovering even post-offer attorney's fees.' 40 The Seventh Circuit rec-
ognized the proposed rule change to Rule 68, but commented that "the
Committee did not discuss and may not have considered the possible impact
of the proposed amendment on attorney's fees statutes, such as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 that are intended to encourage particular types of litigation."'' 4'
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit. 42 The Court
held that when the underlying statute defines costs to include attorney's fees,
such fees must also be included as costs under Rule 68 offers of settlement.
The Court noted with approval Rule 68's policy of encouraging settlements,
and held that when plaintiffs reject an offer more favorable than what they
ultimately recover at trial, the courts will disallow attorney's fees for any
services performed after the Rule 68 offer is rejected.' 43 The Court further
held that Rule 68 does not require the defendant to itemize the settlement
offer into claim and costs amounts. "As long as the offer does not implicitly
or explicitly provide that the judgment not include costs, a timely offer will
be valid.' 44
Although the existing Rule 68 is a "'one-way street,' available only to
those defending against claims,"'' 4 5 the Supreme Court and the Rules Advi-
sory Committee have increased the opportunities and incentives to settle
lawsuits, and these efforts are laudable. Perhaps their combined efforts will
provide the necessary catalyst to encourage plaintiffs and defendants to
seriously consider and accept legitimate settlement offers. Also, the Rules
Advisory Committee has proposed a new Rule 68,146 that would apply in
virtually all civil cases.
140. Id.
141. Marek v. Chesney, 720 F.2d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 31 (1985)
However, the court of appeals overlooked the Committee's comment stating that "[niothing in
the rule affects the court's statutory authority to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party in
certain types of cases . .. [including] 42 U.S.C. § 1988." 98 F.R.D. 357, 366 (1983) (comment
to Aug., 1983 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
This proposed rule received extensive criticism and was replaced with a revised version in
September, 1984. See supra note 139. See, e.g., Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure: Hearings Before the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial
Conference of the United States (Washington D.C., Jan. 18, 1984); Proposed Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Hearings Before the Advisory Committee of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure of the United States Judicial Conferences (Los Angeles, Feb. 3, 1984).
142. 53 U.S.L.W. at 4906.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 4905.
145. 98 F.R.D. 357, 363 (1983).
146. The Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Amendments provides as follows:
Rule 68. Offer of Settlement; Sanctions
At any time more than 60 days after the service of the summons and complaint on a
party but not less than 90 days (or 75 days if it is a counter-offer) before trial, either
party may serve upon the other party but shall not file with the court a written offer,
denominated as a[n] offer under this rule, to settle a claim for the money, property, or
relief specified in the offer and to enter into a stipulation dismissing the claim or to
allow judgment to be entered accordingly. The offer shall remain open for 60 days un-
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
In authorizing the grant of attorney's fees in civil rights cases, Congress
did not advance specifically detailed standards to govern the propriety or
amount of such awards. Congress left these matters to the discretion of the
courts with the direction that such awards be reasonable and be granted to
the prevailing party. Although a court is not required to award fees, in most
cases it will allow a prevailing plaintiff to recover his costs of representation
absent special circumstances. The lack of meaningful standards for deter-
mining what constitutes a reasonable fee in any given case has resulted in
often inconsistent and excessive fee '47 awards which create additional litiga-
tion to settle the claims for such fees.' 8 Clear guidelines must be developed
to balance the Congressional intent to encourage the enforcement of civil
rights against the American rule that requires parties to bear their own
less sooner withdrawn by a writing served on the offeree prior to acceptance by the of-
feree. An offer that remains open may be accepted or rejected in writing by the offeree.
An offer that is neither withdrawn nor accepted within 60 days shall be deemed rejected.
The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer.
Evidence of an offer is not admissible except in proceedings to enforce a settlement or
to determine sanctions under this rule.
If, upon a motion by the offeror within 10 days after the entry of judgment, the court
determines that an offer was rejected unreasonably, resulting in unnecessary delay and
needless increase in the cost of the litigation, it may impose an appropriate sanction
upon the offeree. In making this determination the court shall consider all of the rele-
vant circumstances at the time of the rejection, including (I) the then apparent merit or
lack of merit in the claim that was the subject of the offer, (2) the closeness of the ques-
tions of fact and law at issue, (3) whether the offeror had unreasonably refused to fur-
nish information necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of the offer, (4) whether the
suit was in the nature of a "test case," presenting questions of far-reaching importance
affecting non-parties, (5) the relief that might reasonably have been expected if the
claimant should prevail, and (6) the amount of the additional delay, cost, and expense
that the offeror reasonably would be expected to incur if the litigation should be pro-
longed.
In determining the amount of any sanction to be imposed under this rule the court
also shall take into account (1) the extent of the delay, (2) the amount of the parties'
costs and expenses, including any reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the offeror as
a result of the offeree's rejection, (3) the interest that could have been earned at pre-
vailing rates on the amount that a claimant offered to accept to the extent that the in-
terest is not otherwise included in the judgment, and (4) the burden of the sanction
on the offeree.
This rule shall not apply or derivate actions under Rules 23, 23.1 and 23.2.
102 F.R.D. 407, 432-33 (1984).
Public hearings were held on this proposal on February 1, 1985 in Washington, D.C. and
on February 21, 1985 in San Francisco, California. Marek, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4914, n.59.
147. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 763 F.2d 1580 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W.
3720 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1985) (No. 85-224). The district court in Rivera awarded $243,343.75 in
attorney's fees after the jury awarded $33,350 on the merits-The question presented for review
is "What are the proper standards for a district court's exercise of discretion in awarding
attorney's fees to a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988?"
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
litigation expenses. Since the courts have been unable to arrive at a consistent
and workable standard for the calculation of reasonable fees under the Fees
Act, Congress must weigh national economic considerations and amend the
Fees Act to provide a uniform calculation standard. Only a uniform standard
will eliminate the current confusion over fee awards.
The absence of a uniform standard for the calculation of reasonable fees
also makes it difficult for plaintiffs and defendants to settle fee claims
without litigation. Plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate their claims for fees
because the cost of fee litigation is usually borne by the defendants. Fee
shifting deters plaintiffs from settling meritorious claims 149 and encourages
defendants to settle cases when they have a strong, but potentially unsuc-
cessful, defense.'3 0 Congress should amend the Fees Act to require that fees
be awarded only to parties who clearly and substantially prevail on the issue
for which the fees are being sought.' Such a standard would protect civil
rights defendants when only minor relief or nominal damages are sought.
Additionally, this proposed standard would discourage plaintiffs from bring-
ing frivolous civil rights actions."'
Congress should also enact a uniform hourly rate of compensation for
civil rights attorneys. The enactment of a uniform rate would allow defend-
ants to more fully assess their liability in civil rights cases without adversely
limiting the availability of civil rights attorneys. A fair limitation on the rate
148. See M.F. DERFNER & A. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES 16.01 (1983);
Comment, Calculation of a Reasonable Award of Attorney's Fees under the Attorney's Fees
Award Act of 1976, 13 J. MAR. L. REV. 331, 378 (1980) (in a five year period awards have
varied by 685%).
149. Civil rights plaintiffs should not be penalized for helping to reduce court docket
congestion by settling their cases out of court. See H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
7 (1976).
150. In Linhart v. Glatfelter, 584 F. Supp. 1369, 1372 (N.D. Ill. 1984), the court stated:
[Plublic employees can haul their employers into federal court with comparative
ease under § 1983 since even the most mundane personnel decision can satisfy the
state action requirement of the statute. Faced with the intimidating prospect of
costly federal litigation, including what one respected commentator has called "the
swamp of discovery," and the specter of paying for the plaintiff's lawyer under §
1988 should they lose the case, public employers are often persuaded to capitulate.
Id. at 1372.
151. This is also Recommendation Number 3 of the National Association of Attorneys
General. NAAG REPORT, supra note 97, at 18.
152. As one federal judge has commented:
IM]any of these so-called civil rights actions have proven to have nothing whatever
to do with civil rights as that term is normally understood. Instead, the Constitution
has been debauched as lawyers, "not overly hindered by the courts," have endea-
vored to transform even the most petty complaints against the local government
into federal cases of constitutional dimension. Rather than vindicating fundamental
rights, such lawsuits over the trivial annoyances of everyday life actually diminish
public esteem for the Constitution. When every misstep by government, no matter
how slight, is seized upon as creating a cause of action entitling its holder to a
[Vol. 34:943
A TTORNE Y'S FEES
of compensation would encourage local governments to consider early set-
'tlement in cases when some liability exists, and thereby lessen the impact
that civil rights judgments have on government budgets. Finally, Congress
and the judiciary must use Rule 68 to encourage early settlement. When a
defendant can show that the plaintiff brought a lawsuit principally to obtain
fees, or that a plaintiff rejected an offer of settlement pursuant to Rule 68
and obtained a less favorable judgement, Congress should either limit the
availability of attorney's fees or deny them completely. The use of a lawsuit
to obtain fees does not serve a rational purpose and drains public resources;
such claims must therefore be stopped.
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing analysis indicates, the discretion and subjectivity vested
in the federal courts under section 1988 has engendered considerable conflict.
The straightforward command of section 1988 as an exception to the Amer-
ican rule has caused both an explosion of fee litigation and a proliferation
of fee-shifting statutes that have now made the American rule the exception.
Neither the courts nor Congress have devised clear guidelines for awarding
attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
If any change is to occur in this area, Congress must seriously consider
adopting limits on fee awards. Such limits, however, must not discourage
victims of civil rights violations from litigating their grievances. Congress
must return the focus of civil rights litigation to the aggrieved party and
away from fee considerations. Both the courts and Congress must again
look at the Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 and the other fee shifting
statutes in order to protect more equitably those individuals whose rights
have been violated. Legislative action is urgently needed to establish uniform
standards for setting fees at levels that will attract competent counsel without
granting windfalls to lawyers. Without clear standards, the mushrooming
cloud of litigation will continue to drain the resources of state and local
governments to the detriment of the courts, the public, and the parties whose
civil rights have been violated.
chance at receiving a cash jackpot from a federal jury, plus an award of attorney's
fees as an automatic bonus, important values are lost and the Constitution comes
to be looked upon as a sort of lottery ticket.
Newman v. Village of Hinsdale, 592 F. Supp. 1307, 1307-08 (N.D. II1. 1984).
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